University of Pennsylvania

Law Review
And American Law Register
FOUNDED 1852
d September, by te Uni'my o Pnql.
PublId Moatly. E.-ept July. Aug
vania Law School at 236 Cbetn%* Street. Phl-adelpMa Pa., *ad
34th and Cheatnut Streebs Phadphis. Pa.
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $2.50 PER ANNUM; SINGLE COPIES, 35 CENTS

Board of Editor*:
EDWARD W. MADEIRA. Editor-in-Chle?
B. M. SNOVER, Business Manager
Alaoofate Editors:
THOMAS REATH J.
JOSEPH N. EWING
GEORGE F. DOUGLAS
ROBERT M. GILKEY
EDWARD EISENSTEIN
JAMES F. HENNINGER
BENJAMIN X. KLINE
EARLE HEPBURN
LOUIS E. LEVINTHAL
HARRY INGERSOLL
L. BRADDOCK SCHOFIELD
GUY W. KNAUER
STEPHEN S. SZLAPKA
ALVIN I. LEVI
C. WAGNER
JOSEPH W.LPAUL
RICERD H. WOOLR.

NOTES.
BOYCOTT-WHEN LEGAL--May members of a union lawfully
refuse to work for those employers who continue to do business for
customers who also do business with a non-union shop? Or, in
other words, is it lawful for members of a union to force to the wall
one who refuses to unionize his shop, by threatening to leave their
employers unless the latter insist upon their customers refraining
from doing business with him who eniploys non-union men? This
is the rather complicated question which arose in the case of Gill Engraving Company v. Doerr.' The test there applied was an inquiry
into the legality of the object of the union and the means of attainment. The court found that the object was to increase the power
of the union, and the means applied thereto were legal.2 Inasmuch
as the defendants were found to be employing legal means to gain a
legal end, the injunction was refused.
1214 Fed. Rep.

Iii (i9r4).
"The case came up on motion for an injunction pendente life.

(113)
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Upon the question as to when a boycott is legal the courts are
at great variance and many different tests have been applied. Purpose, object, motive, malice, means, combination, conspiracy, privilege and justification have all formed the basis of decisions upon this
subject. The chief cause for the difference in results reached, however, may be attributed to the original starting point in the analysis
of any one case. Shall the court commence by tracing out the conduct of the. defendants to see if they have committed any illegal act,
or shall it begin its investigation at the point where injury was suffered by the innocent plaintiff and look back from there to find the
cause of such injury?
The result reached will depend in large
measure upon which one of these courses is followed.
The test of the principal case is that most generally applied,is the object in view a legal one and are the means employed also
legal? 3 But when we have come this far, the question arises as to
what the object really is. The immediate and direct result of the
employees' action is the injury to the business of the employer. The
remote and indirect result is the benefit to the employees. Their
organization has gained strength and more work is secured for their
members. Which of these two is the so-called object? The courts
are in conflict as to how this question should be answered and it is
almost impossible to foretell the decision upon any given state of
facts. 4 Cases within the same jurisdiction cannot be reconciled.5
The decisions in practically all of these cases of boycotting are
largely influenced by considerations of public policy rather than by
application of legal principles. The main question as to what is the
object of the union will- elicit entirely different answers dependent
upon the point of view from which it is approached. Shall the labor
organizations be approved and encouraged or shall their rapid advance be checked? This is really the underlying proposition. One
who feels that the working man is downtrodden and oppressed, will
doubtless decide the boycott to be legal, while another man of
equally sound mind will consider as-paramount the right of the employer to trade freely.
Looking at the situation from the standpoint of the employer,
should he not have a right to do business with whom he will, at his
pleasure? Should he be left without redress from injury suffered
at the hands of those who are forcing upon him the alternative of
employing union men or doing no business? The right to a free
'Newton v. Erickson. x26 N. Y. Supp. 949 (i91i); Rosenau 'v. Empire
Circuit Co., ir5 N. Y. Snpp. 511 (9o9); Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33
(1897); 'National Protective Assn v. Cumming, 17o N. Y. 315 (i9o2);
Macaulcy Bros. v. Tierney, ig R. 1. 255 (1895); Lindsay & Co. v. Montana
Federation of Labor, 37 Mont. 264 (igo8).
' Purvis v. Local No. 500, 214 Pa. 348 (i9o6); Macauley Bros. v. Tierney,
su pro: American Federation of Labor v. Buck's Stove Co., 33 App. D. C. 83
(1909).
"Newton v. Erickson, supra; Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, .jupra.
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market has been advanced in a few cases.6 It is submitted that this
theory, although difficult of application, is founded upon sound legal
principles. Every person has, or should have, a right to dispose of
his goods without molestation from those in no wise connected with
the immediate transaction.
If it be granted that one has a right to be free from outside interference in his effort to carry on his business, it would naturally
follow that all others owed him a duty not to interfere. When we
then find pressure being briought to bear upon the employer's customers, we know that his right has not been respected and that
those whose actions caused the injury have been guilty of a breach
of duty. The right of the one and the correlative duty of the others
should be taken as the starting point from which the analysis of the
facts is made.
A breach of the employer's right having been discovered, the
employees are prima facie liable for the injury suffered. Upon
what grounds, then, if any, shall the employees be excused from
answering to the employer and making redress for the injurious results of their acts? Can it be said that the advancement of their own
private interests is such an object as to justify their mode of conduct and relieve them from all liability towards the employer? To
be sure, this question has been answered in the affirmative by many,
and the court in the principal case went so far as to say that such
an object was "now regarded as laudable."7 But in spite of this
authority, we cannot submit to a theory setting forth the idea that
what would otherwise be an unlawful proceeding may be made lawful by the fact that the perpetrators thereof are to reap benefit for
themselves therefrom.
When the employee's conduct has been once established as
prima facie illegal, some justification more powerful than selfadvancement should be substantially proven before they are freed
from liability. It is commonly admitted that public policy must
8
govern this situation.

But what is public policy?

Surely it is not

that which bestows benefit upon one class of individuals, forbids
redress to him who was injured while innocently engaged in carrying on his business, and accomplishes nothing in the interest of the
public. In order successfully to plead public policy as an excuse for
the open interference with the employer's right to do business, it
should be shown that the interests of the community at large were
beneficially affected. Those who cause injury to an innocent man
should pay the penalty therefor unless they show a more substantial
justification than the gratification of a purely selfish desire to
strengthen the union of which they are members.

J.N.E.
'See the elaborate opinion of Vice Chancellor Stevenson in Booth v.

Burgess. 72 N. J. E. 181 (ig96).
' Page 12.
'See opinion of Holmes, J., in Vegelahn v. Gantner, i67 Mass. zo6 (896).
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APPLICATION OF THE SEVENTH
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AMENDMENT TO CASES UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIAI1LITY ACT

-The Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides: "In

suits at common law where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by .jury shall be preserved and no
fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of
the United States than according to the rules of the common law."
It has repeatedly been held that this means a trial as at the common
law of England, that is, by a jury of twelve men,' unanimous in their
finding.2 This limitation, however, is solely a limitation on the Federal government, and in the absence of prohibitions in State constitutions a State may at its pleasure abridge or destroy the right to
jury trial. This right has been exercised in a number of the States
may be rendered by less than the
in many of which a valid verdict
unanimous vote of twelve men. 4
The Federal Employers' Liability Act5 creates new causes of
action for injuries arising out of interstate commerce, and in the
Sixth Section of the Amendment of i9o8 it is provided that: "The
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this Act shall

be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States and no
case arising under this Act and brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States."
Thus the administration of these federal causes of action is given
concurrently to the State and federal courts where the course of
action accrues. Since the federal courts may not, but the State
courts may, allow a less than Unanimous verdict, an interesting
question is raised when an action is brought under this act in a State
court in which a veidict need not be unanimous. In such a case is
the defendant's right to trial by jury being preserved, as required by
the Seventh Amendment? The solution of the problem depends, of
course, on the meaning put on the words of the amendment;
whether it is to-be construed as a limitation on Congress or a limita'Capital Traction Co. v. Hop, 174 U. S. I, p. x3 (1899).
'American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S. -464, p. 468 (1897).
"Pearson v. Yendall, 95 U. S. 24 (1877).
' In eleven of the state constitutions there are provisions that fractional
verdicts may be rendered by juries of twelve men: Idaho, Art. I, Sec. 7;
Kentucky, Sec. 248; Minnesota, Art. I, Sec. 4; Nevada, Art. I, Sec. 3; New
Mexico, Art. II, Sec. 12; Missouri, Art. II. Sec. 28; Ohio. Art. I, Sec. s;
Oklahoma, Art. II, Sec. i9; South Dakota, Art. VI, Sec. 6; Texas, Art. I,
Sec. x5, Art. V, Sec. 13; Washington, Art. I, Sec. 2r.
In eight states "short juries,' i. e., those consisting of less than twelve
men, are authorized: California, Art. I,'Sec. 7; Colorado, Art. II, See..23;
Georgia, Art. V, Sec. i8; Montana, Art. III, Sec. 23; Nebraska, Art. I, Se.
6; Utah. Art. I. Sec. zo; Virginia, Art. I. Sec. ii; Wyoming, Art. I, Sec. 9.
In Louisiana there is no constitutional guarantee of trial by jury in civil
cases.

In the remaining twenty-eight states the common law jury exists without
alteration.
'35 Statutes at Large, 65, as amended by Act of 5th AprIl, x9o8, 36
Statutes at Large, 291.
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tion on the procedure in the federal courts; if the Seventh Amendment prevents Congress from allowing any causes of 5ction created
by it to be tried other than by a common law jury, then obviously no State court can entertain jurisdiction unless its courts
can provide the common law jury; but if the limitation is merely a
procedural one, providing a method of trial which is to prevail in
the federal courts, then the defendant is deprived of no constitutional right if a verdict is rendered by less than twelve men.
The right to a trial by jury has always been considered a substantive right involving much more than a procedural question. "The
Seventh Amendment, indeed, does not attempt to regulate matters
of pleading or practice.

..

. Its aim is not to preserve mere

matters of form and procedure but substance of right." If this is
true, it would seem that the limitation was one on Congress, and that
therefore the right to a common law jury trial is inherent in all
causes of action created by Congress and that jurisdiction of federal
causes of action can only be given by Congress to those State courts
which are equipped to provide a common law jury trial.
The constitutionality of this concurrent jurisdiction provision
of the Federal Employers' Liability Act has been raised in three
recent cases, in which, however, the decisions have not been uniform
nor has the question been discussed with the fullness Tthat its importance deserves. In Huszty v. Erie Railroad Compan it was recognized by Judge Stevens that the Ohio court could not try an action
based on the Federal Employers' Liability Act except by requiring
a unanimous verdict, which appeared to be prohibited by the laws of
Ohio.3. He escaped the dilemma by construing the Ohio statute as
meaning that the right to trial by jury should remain inviolate except that where the legislature had power to legislate, it might
authorize a three-fourths verdict. Since, he argued, the legislature
of Ohio has no power to legislate concerning a federal cause of
action, this was a case in which the right to trial by jury remained
inviolate and the State court had jurisdiction. It is to be noted that
the court thought the Ohio provision for a three-fourths verdict
would have been an unsurmountable obstacle to jurisdiction of the
State court, had it not been for the rather strained construction put
upon the Ohio statute, and that when jurisdiction was taken, the
right to a unanimou.s verdict was preserved.
In Winters v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Company,* a
case in a county court of Minnesota upon similar facts, it was held
that the jury might return a five-sixths verdict, as provided in the
*Brewer, J., in Walker v. New Mexico & S. P. R. Co., x6S U. S. S,
p. 596 (2897).
116 Ohio Nisi Prius N. S. 254; Ohio Law Rep., October A6, x914.
'Constitution of Ohio, Art. 1, Sec. 5. Gen. Code, §§1r455-7.
0 148 N. NV.Rep. io6 (Minn. 1914).
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Minnesota laws.' 0 Commissioner Dibell stated, "The State court
had jurisdiction. The law of the forum as to what constitutes a
lawful jury applies. The character of the cause of action does not
determine it. The five-sixths jury law is authorized by the State
Constitution and is not prohibited to the State by the Federal Constitution." If it be true, as suggested above, that the right to a trial
by common law jury inheres in every cause of action created by
Congress, the court is incorrect in stating that the character of the
cause of action does not determine what constitutes a lawful jury.
This important point is given no consideration in this case.
In Gibson v. Bellingham & Northern Railway Company,' an
action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act had been brought
in a State court of Washington and removed to the federal court
Neterer, District Judge, sustained a motion to remand on the ground
that the State court was fully compltent to try the case, although
by the laws of Washington a verdict iay be rendered-by ten out of
the twelve jurors. 2 He expressed the opinion that, "There is no
sound reason why the principle [that the lex fori governs as to procedure] should be different "when a right of action created by a federal statute is sought to be enforced in a State court. The right of
trial by a jury of twelve, where the assent of all is necessary to a
verdict, is but a method of trial prevailing in the federal courts. The
fact that it is prescribed by the Federal Constitution does not change
its essential character. It was intended to regulate the procedure of
trials in the federal courts, not to be annexed as a condition to the
enforcement of a right of action." But this language is opposed to
that of Mr. Justice Brewer, when he said that the aim of the Seventh Amendment was to preserve substance of right, not mere procedure.1'
The meagre authority does not present a very satisfactory solution of this problem, and it can only be a matter of conjecture what
the decision of the Supreme Court will ultimately be. From a practical standpoint there are great difficulties in the way of either of the
views, which must be taken. Since Congress in adopting the Employers' Liability Act, "spoke for all the people and all the States
and thereby established a policy for all,"" ' it becomes the duty of the
courts to adopt a construction of the Act which will render its administration as consistent and nearly uniform as possible. If it be
held that only the State courts which can compel a unanimous verdict can have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts, then
in some States a plaintiff may sue either in State or federal courtsi
whereas in other States he will be able to sue only in the federal
"Gen. St. Minn., 1913, §§78o5, 7806.
11213 Fed. Rep. 488 (District Court of Vashington, 1914).
"Constitution of WaShington, Art; I, Sec. 21. R. & B. Code, §35&
'Supra, note 6.

"Second Employers' Liability Cases,

223

U. S. 1, p. 57

(1912).

NOTES
courts.

If, on the other hand, all State courts are held to have this

concurrent jurisdiction, how can a consistent administration of the
law be accomplished by verdicts of seven jurors in Virginia, nine of
twelve in Ohio, ten of twelve in Washington, and by the judge himself if the jury disagrees in Louisiana?
T..R., Jr.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-POLICE

POWER-REGULATION

AND

FIXING OF RATEs-In view of the modern tendency toWard governmental control of corporate enterprises and the increasing number
of statutory restrictions on business, the recent decision in the case
of the German Alliance Insurance Company v. Lewis' is very interesting. In that case the Supreme Court of the United States held
that a statute passed by the legislature of Kansas fixing the rates to
be charged by all stock insurance companies operating in that State

was valid and not repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
In the early stages of the English law, especially from the middle of the fourteenth century to the early part of the eighteenth

century, the attempts by the State to regulate private employments
and private trade were manifold. In this regard the growth of the
English law has seen a change until ite present condition is one of
virtually complete non-interference. On the other hand, the
growth of the law respecting the control of public and quasi-public
employments has been from a condition of comparative freedom to
one of complete and adequate supervision and control.1
In this country the early history of such legislation is brief.
Owing to the great financial distress and commercial uncertainty incident to the Revolution attempts were made in the various States
to control prices, both of labor and commodities, .by statutes. The
futility of such legislation became at once evident, however, and the
statutes were repealed almost immediately, without ever having been
enforced.3 Upon the adoption of the Constitution, the question of
the regulation of business became, in a great number of cases, a

constitutional one. Under the Constitution the power of the States

with regard to police regulations within their respective boundaries
is supreme. Under the exercise of this power private interests
must be made subservient to the general interest and welfare of the
community,4 provided, however, that the exercise of said power

'34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 612

(1914).

88. III.
'Stickney,-State
and Commerce,
Commerce, p.Chap.
of Trade
Trade and
Control of
Stickney,--State Control
"Slaughter House Cases, 83 U. S. 36 (1872). As to the extent of the
police power, Redfield. J., in Thorpe v. R. R., 27 Vt. 140 (1855), p. 149, Says:
"The police power of the state extends to the protection of the lives, limbs,
health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property

within the state. According. to the maxim, Sw utere tuo ut alienum non.
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must not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.6
The limit to the exercise of the police power with respect -to the
fixing of rates and charges lies in the distinction between private
property and private employments .pr the ope hand, and public ahd
quasi-public employments and prol ery-iised in such employments,
on the other hand. The right of citizens-to pursue ordinary callings
and vocations upon their own terms is a part of their right of liberty
and property, and any law.which abridges or prevents this privilege
is obnoxious to the Constitution. 6 On the other hand it has long
been well established that the business of railroad companies as
common carriers is of such a public nature as to subject them to
legislative control as to rates and freights.7 The principle has also
been extended to include the business of street railways,' ferries,'
bridges,10 turnpike roads,"" telegraph companies,12 telephone companies, 1s gas companies,"4 water companies, 5 irrigation projects,"
laedas, which is of universal application, it must, of course, be within the
range of legislative action to define the mode and manner ifi which everyone may so use his own as not to injure others. . . . By this general
police power of the state, persons and property are subjected to all kinds
of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general health, comfort
and prosperity of the state; of the perfect right of the legislature to do
which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledged general principles, ever
can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned"
'Exparte Dickey, 144 Cal. 234 (19o4), (Act limiting the compensation
which an employment agent might receive held unconstitutional); People v.
Coler, 166 N. Y. i (i9oi), (Statute providing that laborers on public works
should be paid the prevailing rate of wages held void); Street v. Electrical
8
Supply Co., i6o Ind. .3 (x9o), (Act providing that unskilled labor employed on any public work of the state, counties, etc., should receive not
less than twenty cents an hour held repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment).
'Allegeyer v. Louisiana, i65 U. S. 578. (1897).
IChicago, C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. i55 (i877) ; Peik v. Chicago

& N. W. R. Co., 94 U. S. 164 (1877).
* Commonwealth v. Inter. Con. Street R. Co., 187 Mass. 436 (i9o) ; Buffalo East Side R. Co. v. Buffalo Street R. Co., xxi N. Y. x32 (1888).
'Parker v. Met. R. Co., io9 Mass. 506 (1872); State v. Hudson County,
23 N. J. L. 2o6 (x8.),--affirmed in 24 N. J. L. 718 (I854).
" Canada So. R. Co. v. International. Bridge Co, 8 Fed. Rep. 19o (x88i).
Covington L. Turnpike Co. v. Sanford, 164 U. S. 578 (1896).
" Western Union Tel. Co. v. Myatt, 98 Fed. Rep. 335 (i9)..
2'Central Union Tel. C. v. Falley; xr8 Ind. 194 (i88o),-affirmed in zx8
Ind. s98 (i88o).
"New Memphis Gas & Light Co. v. Memphis, 72 Fed. Rep. 952 (1895);
Rushville v. Rushville Nat. Gas Co., 132 Ind. 575 (i892).
'Spring Valley Water Co. v. Schottler, ito U. S. 347 (1884) ; Tampa v.
Tampa Waterworks, 45 Fla. 6o0 (z9o3),--affirmed in i99 U. S. 241 (2903).
" San Diego Land and Town Co. v. Jasper, 89 Fed. Rep. 274 (1898).
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wharfage,' milling,18 log booming and salving.1 ' It will be noticed
that in eac-h of the foregoing cases the business is one in which the
property employed is devoted to a public use; or the property has
been acquired under the right of eminent domain; or the business is
conducted under a franchise; or there is a holding out to do business
with the public.
A decided extension of the power to regulate rates by legislative enactment was made by the decision in the case of Munn v.
Ililbois.'" In that decision the Supreme Court laid down for the
first time ihe proposition that where the circumstances surrounding
a particular business, or its character, make it a "virtual monopoly",
the State can regulate the conduct of that business. As a basis for
their decision the court invoked the principle of the common law
that when private property is "affected by a public interest it ceases
to be huris privati only" and so is subject to regulation by the State.
This regulation the Supreme Court held might extend to the fixing
of rates. Since that decision it has become well established that the
right exists in the State to regulate the charges to be made by those
whose business is "affected by a public interest".21 The phrase
"affected by a public interest" is somewhat'vague but appears to be
used as descriptive of a business which is indispensable to the comfort or convenience of the whole community, or which so directly
affects such a large proportion of the people that the public prosperity and welfare may be considered to depend in some measure
upon its being conducted upon fair and just principles and without
unreasonable exactions.
In its recent decision in the German Alliance Insurance Company Case. the Supreme Court has re-affirmed the principle that the
police power of a State extends to a regulation of the rates or
charges to be made in a business "affected by a public interest".'Ouachita, etc., Packet Co. v. Aiken, 12 U. S. 444 (1887).
, State v. Edwards. 86 Me. 1o2 (x894) ; West v. Rawson, 4o W. Va. 480
(1895).
"Henry v. Roberts, So Fed. Rep. go2 (1892) ; West Branch, etc., Exchange v. Fisher, i5o Pa. 475 0892); Underwood, etc., Co. v. Boom Co., 76
Wis. 6 (i8gi).
"94 U. S. 113 (1876). In this case seven warehouses, controlled by
thirty people, had practical control of all the grain shipped through Chicago
from the Northwest to eastern points.
I Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517 (i89); Brass v. North Dakota, 253
U. S. 39T (1893). In the latter case the doctriie of the Munn Case was
extended to the regulation of grain warehouses where there was not a present
monopoly or possibility of a future monopoly. It is also worth while to note
that it was strongly contended by Field, J.. dissenting in the Munn Case, and
by Brewer, J, dissenting in the case of Budd v. New York,. that the right
to regulate rates is dependent upon showing that the property employed in

the business in question has been dcvoted to a public use. See also on this
point. Savage. J., in the case of Brown v. Gerald, 1oo Me. 351 (i9o5).
Black on Constitutional Law, 3rd ed., p. 412.

Lamar, J., delivered a dissenting opinion, based on the same grounds
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In that respect the decision is unquestionably sound. It may be questioned, however, whether the holding the insurance business to be
"affected by a public interest" was not an unwarranted extension of
the operation of the principle.24 In the three leading cases establishing the principle2 the Supreme Court seemed to be influenced to
some extent, at least, by the characteristics of the businesses involved, viz., the fact that they were virtual monopolies ;2.their relation to the business of transportation and to the business of common
carriers. None of these characteristics are present in the case of the
insurance business and the court on this point of the leading case
seems to have based its decision on the huge ramifications of the insurance business as a whole, the large property interests involved,
and the resulting necessity for control for the protection of the ordinary citizen. The court recognized, as it always has, that no general
power resides in the legislature to regulate private business, prescribe the conditions under which it shall be conducted, fix the prices
of commodities or services, or interfere with the freedom of the contract. Notwithstanding, the court held the insurance business to be
subject to regulation to the extent of fixing its rates. Was it justified in so holding?
Since the case of Paul v. Virginia21 it has been established that
the carrying on of insurance business is not commerce. 2s It would
seem, by the weight of opinion, that an insurance policy is a perIt is clear, howeer, that the insursonal contract of indemnity.
as the opinions of Field, J., in the Munn Case, and Brewer, J., in the case
of Budd v. New York (see n.21, supra). White, C. J., and Van Devanter,
J., joined in the dissent.
"An important factor which influenced the court in the case of Munn
v. Illinois to enunciate the praciple affirmed and extended by our leading
case was the English case of Alnutt v. Ingles, 12 East, 527 (Eng. i8io). In
that case warehouses which enjoyed a virtual monopoly by reason of certain
statutes were held to be so invested with a public interest as to be subject
to government regulation.

It is interesting to note, however, that Lord

Ellenborough, during the argument in that case, said: "The business of insurances and. counting houses may be carried on elsewhere, and therefore do
not apply."

It is clear, therefore, that Lord Ellenborough did not consider

the insurance business of his time to be so affected by a public interest as to
justify regulation of its rates.
" Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (i87-6) ; Budd v. New York, 143 U. S.
517 (i8gi) ; Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391 (1893).
" This statement does not apply to the case of Brass v. North Dakota,
where there was no present monopoly, or even danger of a future monopoly.
Nevertheless, on the authority of the Munn Case, the Supreme Court held

that conducting a warehouse, even though primarily for the owner's private
enterprise, was a business "affected by a public interest."

'8 Wail x68 (868).
;Hooper v. California, iss U. S. 648 (i89S); N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer
86 Tex. 250 (1893).
"Hooper v. California,' i55 U. S. 648; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge
County, 231 U. S. 49.5 (x913); Amer. Surety Co. v. Shallenberger, -83 Fed.
Rep. 6,36 (i9io).

'VOTES
ance business is considered of such importance that a State may
regulate or restrirt the formation of contracts of insurance within
its borders ;30 and there is authority for the proposition that fire insurance is a business affected by a public interest.31 But until the
decision in our leading case no court had gone so far as to permit
rate fixing. Indeed, a recent decision in a federal court held a
statute passed by the legislature of Nebraska fixing the maximum
charges and rates of premium to be charged by all surety companies
operating in that State, to be void because repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.' 2
It is clear from the foregoing review of the decisions that the
Supreme Court has gone considerably further than ever before in
holding that the business of insurance is so much affected by a public interest as to justify a State, in the exercise of its police power,
in regulating the rates or premiums which shall be charged for insurance. As to the wisdom and justification for such holding we will
quote from an opinion of the Supreme Court in an earlier opinion:
"Though reasonable doubts may exist as to the power of the legislature to pass a law or as to whether a law is calculated to promote
the health, safety or comfort of the people, or to secure good order,"
-I in other words, whether it is within the legitimate exercise of the
police power]---"we must resolve them in favor of that department
of the government. . . . The question in each case is whether the
legislature has adopted the statute in the exercise of a reasonable discretion, or whether its action is a mere excuse for an unjust discrimination, or the oppression or spoliation of a particular class". u
R.M.G.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-EXTRADITION-SUFFICIENCY OF PAPERS

-The melodramatic escape of Harry K. Thaw from Mlatteawan,
N. Y., where he was confined as an insane person, in accordance
with a decree of custody following a verdict of "not guilty of murder but insane," and his subsequent capture in New Hampshire have
produced a new situation in interstate extradition proceedings.
When the State of New York claimed the right of extradition,
under the Constitution1 of the United States, the governor of New
" Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Clements, 14o U. S. 226 (i89x); Hooper
v. California, 155 U. S. 648 (1895); Com. v. Vrooman, 164 Pa. 3o6 (1894).
'No. Amer. Ins. Co. v. Yates, 214 II1.272 (19o5) ; State v. Fireman's Ins.
Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 372 (igo8) ; People v. Loew, 44 N. Y. Supp., 42; Com. v.
Vrooman, 164 Pa. 3o6 (1894).
'*Amer. Surety Co. v. Shallenberger, 183 Fed. Rep. 636 (1910).
'Brown, J., in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 391 (x898).
'Art. IV. Sec. 2: "A person charged in any state with treason, felony or
other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall,

on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be
delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime."
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Hampshire decided in favor of the sufficiency of the requisition
papers, which set forth the flight and an indictment which, referring
to the character of the custody under which Thaw had been held and
reciting the details of the escape, charged a "conspiracy to prevent
and obstruct justice and the due administration of law." Thereupon, Thaw brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in order
to prevent extradition.
It is intimated in the opinion 2 of Judge Aldrich, who granted
the writ, that the indictment was insufficient in substance for the
reason that "neither the place of the alleged conspiracy, nor the
means or manner of developing the escape, nor the knowledge or
-intention of obstructing justice and the due administration of law,
are with particularity, if at all, set out."3 However, the court's
decision is not based "upon the techinal analysis of the question of
crime in such a situation" but it flatly holds that extradition could
not be obtained for the reasons, first, that the flight was not from
the crime charged in the indictment, but, from the custody in Matteawan; secondly, that the requisition papers "upon their face negative the idea of personal criminal responsibility." "Every person is
presumed to be sane until the contrary appears, but papers which,
in the description of the person and of an alleged crime involved in
an escape from control because of a finding of insanity and criminal
irresponsibility, do not embrace the constitutional elements, and are
not operative because insanity and criminal irresponsibility being
proved are presumed to continue until the contrary appears."' The
principal reason for these views as given by the court is that the arbitrary power of extradition should not be extended beyond the
"field of strict crime" so as to apply to "indifferent and uncertain situations in respect to which the executive is not in a position to investigate the merits."
The case is contrary to the weight of authority in so far as the
element of flight from the particular crime charged is required. As
a general rule, it is sufficient if the accused was within the jurisdiction of the demanding State at the time of the commission of the
crime and has subsequently been found in another State,5 even
though the latter be his domicile.6 It is not necessary that the proseThe Act of Congress of Feb. 12, 1793, I Stat. 3o2, provided a uniform method
of carrying out this provision. The first and second sections of this act
have been re-enacted in §§5278 and 5279 of the revised statutes; U. S. Comp.
Stat. zQ0o,p. 359.
'Ex Parte Thaw, 214 Fed. Rep. 424 (1914).

'Ibd., p. 437.
bt.
p . 43o.
'Roberts v. Reilly, x16 U. S. 8o (1885); State v. Richter, 37 Minn. 436
(1887); Com. v. Hare, 36 Pa. Super. Ct 125 (I907); Taylor v. Wise, 126

N. W. Rep. 1726 (Ia. Igio); Bishop, "New Criminal Procedure," p. 6o;
Bailey, Habeas Corpus, p. 52.5.
( Kingsbury's Case. io6 Mass. 223 (2870); In re Sultan, TTS N. C. 57
(18N).

NOTES

cution have begun before the flight or that there be an intent to
elude justice. 7 The belief of the accused that he had committed no
crime is immaterial
Although in the principal case, the court took into consideration
that extradition was sought nominally to punish for the conspiracy,
but actually for the purpose of recommitment to Matteawan, it is
usually held that the motive of the State demanding extradition is
irrelevant;9 and that any ulterior purpose behind'the prosecution
will not be inquired into.20 Evidence that the indictment was procured improperly is incompetent." ' The question whether or not
there will be a fair trial in the demanding State will not be considered. 2 It is well settled that courts of the asylum State cannot inquire into the merits of the crime charged." Thus, the innocence
or probable guilt of the accused will not be investigated, but will be
left for the determination of the tribunals of the State where the
crime is alleged to have been committed."' Under this rule, evidence
of the insanity of the accused is not admissible in extradition proceedings.2.
Although there are no cases holding precisely that an indictment, on its face showing that the person indicted is insane, is insufficient as a basis for extradition, the decision in the principal case
may be supported upon analogy to the numerous cases 1' which have
laid down the general rule that an indictment must substantially
charge the commission of an offense under the laws of the demand'People v. Pinkerton, 17 Hun z99 (N. Y. 1879); Ex Parle Brown, 28
Fed. Rep. 653 (1886); contra: Degant v. Michael, 2 Ind. 396 (185o), which
holds, as in the principal case, that the accused must have left for the sole
purpose of escaping punishment for the crime charged.
'Appleyard v. Mass., 2o3 U. S. = (z9o6). In some jurisdictions, the

question whether the accused is a fugitive from justice is one of fact to be
decided by the governor of the state from which extradition is sought, and his
decision thereon is not reviewable. Dennison v. Christian, 72 Neb. 7o3
(1904); affirmed, 196 U. S. 637 (19o5).

In other jurisdictions, his decision

is merely prima facie evidence and may be reviewed by habeas corpus proceedings. In re Mohr, 73 Ala. 5o3 (x883); Farrell v. Hawley, 78 Conn. i5o
(gos).
' Com. v. Superintendent of Co. Prison, 22o Pa. 401 (igo8) ; In re.Bloch,
87 Fed. Rep. 981 (1898)..
"Ex Parte Denning, So Tex. Crim. 629 (xgo7).
11U. S. v. McClay, 4 Cent. " . 25S (1877).
"Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U. S. 63 (1909).
People v. Hyatt, 172 N. Y. 174 (io) ; Re Greenough, 31 Vt. 279 (1858).
"People v. Donohue, 84 N. Y. 438 (i88r).
,Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U. S. 447 (1913). In this case,; the question was
not presented upon the face of the indictment.
"Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U. S. 387 (r9o8) ; Barriere v. State, 142 Ala. 72
(1904) ; In re Voorhees, 32 N. J. L 141 (x867) ; Armstrong v. Van de Vanter,
The fact that an indictment has been found is prima
21 Wash. 682 (1899).
facie evidence that the statements therein are sufficient to donstitute a crime
in the demanding state. In re Renshaw, 18 S. D. 32 (i9o4).

126

UNIVERSITY OP PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

ing State; that is, the essential elements constituting a crime must be
stated. However. indictments will not be held insufficient merely
l.ccause they are faulty in form."1 But courts go far in holding what
amounts only to matters of form. Thus, an indictment averring
merely that the defendant had sold "intoxicating liquors contrary to
the laws of the State" has been held sufficient.18 An averment of
larceny from a company without stating that it was a corporation
capable of ownership of the property stolen was held to be only formally defective. 9 Extradition was granted upon an indictment setting forth facts indicating that embezzlement had been committed,
and concluding
"so" the defendant "did steal, take and carry
20
away.)
Notwithstanding that the majority of jurisdictions will inquire
into the substantial as opposed to the formal sufficiency of an indictment, there are some authorities 21 which take the view,-which it is
submitted is the better one,-that the fact that an indictment has
been found is enough to justify extradition, and that its sufficiency
should be left for the decision of the courts of the demanding State,
as are questions of guilt, motive and other matters which have been
previously enumerated. It is suggested that the full faith and credit
clause 2 of the United States Constitution should apply when an
indictment found by one State is before the courts of another State.
Also, it is submitted that the cases, holding that no constitutional
right has been violated where a person charged with crime has been
forcibly abducted from the asylum State to the demanding State
without proper extradition proceedings, 8 are an indication that the
purpose of the latter is chiefly to ascertain the authenticity of the
requisition papers and the identity of the person charged therein.
An appeal from the decision of the principal case has been
taken to the United States Supreme Court. Should that court affirm
the judgment, the question will of course be presented as to what
,tMunsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364 (igo5), where a single indictment set
forth three distinct offences.
"Brown's Case, x12 Mass. 409 (1873).
"Roberts v. Reilly, supra, note 5.
"Ex parte Sheldon, 34 Ohio 319 (z878).
"Matter of Briscoe, 5x How. Pr. 422 (N. Y. 1876) ; Homer v. U. S, x43
U. S. 57o (1892), in which case, the petitioner was charged with sending
circulars by mail concerning lotteries, and the court refused to determine,
in habeas corpus proceedings, whether the scheme was a lottery but held that
the question was properly triable in demanding state. Hawley, "Interstate
Extradition," p. 34; Pearce v. Texas, i55 U. S. 311 (894); People v. Police
Commissioners, 9z N. Y. Supp. 76o (i9o5), where the court stated that a
tribunal of an asylum state would not be justified in holding an indictment
so fanulty as to charge no offence, unless, in an extreme case, no other rational
conclusion could be reached.
"Art. V, Sec.. x..
"In re Moore, 75 Fed. Rep. 821 (1896); Pettibone v. Nichols, 2o3 U. .
192

(igo6).
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remedy may be had under the circumstances of the case. Judge
Aldrich suggests that the right of guardianship control, existing in.
the State, under the doctrine of parens patriae, should operate
extraterritorially under the rules of comity applying to the ordinary
cases of guardian and ward, so that if the return were sought of "a
person who had escaped from custody based upon insanity or dangerous mental condition at the time of the commitment, and if at
the time his recovery is sought, his mental condition was an open one
under the decisions of the State creating the guardianship, and the
right of control being based solely upon mental condition, that
question and others . . . would be a proper subject of inquiry
in a proper proceeding ' raising the question of the right of the
guardian to continue his control."' 5 The necessity of legislation
upon the subject has been recognized in Massachusetts where a
statute 26 providing for interstate rendition of those who have
escaped from custody as insane persons in a State and have fled to
Massachusetts.
"A.L.L.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE-STATE REGULATION-FERRIES-The
difficulties attending any exact division of power where the State and
federal governments have concurrent jurisdiction are nowhere more
apparent than in the cases involving the State control of interstate
commerce. The extent of the power of the States to authorize and
regulate interstate ferries raises a phase of this problem. The power
to regulate ferries over waters entirely within their limits is one that
may be exercised exclusively by the States," but whether a State may
regulate ferries over waters separating two States was a debatable
question until a recent decision by the Supreme Court of the United
States in PortRichmond and Bergen Point Ferry Company v. Board
of Freeholders.2 A New Jersey statute of I799 empowers the boards
of chosen freeholders to fix the rates to be taken- at ferry stations
within their respective counties. The board of Hudson County fixed
the rates to be taken by ferries plying between that county and New
York City. The court, by Mr. Justice Hughes, held that the statute
did not infringe the constitutional prerogative of the Congress of
the United States to regulate interstate commerce.
From a time antedating the Revolution, States have exercised
the power of regulating ferries and no exception has been made in
the case of interstate ferries. When the power came to be contested

"4Habeas Corpus proceedings.
" P. 44! of the principal case.
"Act of ixo9, §§87-o, "Acts & Resolves of Mass.," p. 707.
'Miller v. St. Clair County, 7 Ill. 197 (1845); Marshall v. Grimes, 41
Miss. 27 (1866); Carrol v. Campbell, io8 Mo. 55o (i89I).
234 Supreme Court Rep. 8z (1914).
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under the Federal Constiution. the States held they had only potentially ceded their jurisdiction to Congress and could therefore continue to exercise it until Congress intervened.3 In an early case,
Gibbons v. Ogden,4 there is a dictum by Chief Justice Marshall to
the effect that laws respecting turnpike roads, ferries, etc., form a
portion of the immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the limits of a State not surrendered to the federal
government. Later cases, 5 following that suggestion, have sustained
the powers of one State to grant a license or franchise for a ferry
across a navigable river, being the boundary between the granting
State and another State, upon the theory that the nature of the business of ferrying is such that the granting of the privilege on the
subject does not regulate interstate commerce.
It is manifest, however, that the transportation of persons and
property from one State to another is none the less interstate commerce because conducted by ferry and it is not open to question that
ferries maintained for that purpose ar, subject to the regulating
power of Congress. It necessarily follows that whatever may properly be regarded as a direct burden upon interstate commerce, as
conducted by ferries operating between States, it is beyond the
competency of the State to impose. This was definitely decided in
Gloucester Ferry Company v. Pennsylvania.6 The Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania had imposed a tax on the business of landing and
receiving passengers and freight at a wharf in Philadelphia, on
transportation across the Delaware River from New Jersey, by a
ferry company incorporattd and domiciled in New Jersey. The tax
upon the "receiving.and landing of passengers and freight at the
wharf in Philadelphia," which was a necessary incident to the transportation across the Delaware River, was a tax upon that transportation, and in this view the tax was held to be void as one laid upon
interstate commerce. It was expressly declared in the Gloucester
Ferry Case that ferriage over a stream constituting a boundary between two States was within the grant of Congress to regulate commerce and therefore not subject to be directly burdened by a State. It
was also recognized that in view of the character of such ferries and
the diversity of regulation which might be required, the right to regulate them came within that class of subjects which although within
the power of Congress, the States had the right to deal with until
Congress had manifested its paramount and exclusive authority.
The doctrine of the early cases, that the police power of the
States extends to the regulation of ferries over navigable rivers con' People v. Babcock, is Wend. 587 (N. Y. 1834) ; Freeholders of Hudson
Co. v. State, 24 N. J. L 718 (1853).
'9 Wheat. x (U. S. i824).
' Fanning v. Gregoire, i6 How. 524 (U. S. 1853); Conway v. Taylor,
i Black, 6o (U. S. M86i); Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, xo7 U. S.
36 (882).
ii4 U. S. 6 (884).

NOTES

stituting boundaries between States, became a doubtful question by
the ruling in the case of Coi'ngton Bridge Company v. Kentucky.!

The Supreme Court of the United States took the view that one
State has not the power to regulate the rates of toll over a bridge
connecting that State with another. The opinion was expressed that
the principle involved was identical with that applied in Wabash
Railroad Company v. Illinoiss with respect to interstate railroad

rates, and that it was impossible at least in the absence of mutual
action for either State to fix a tariff of charges. It was pointed out,
however, that the State of Kentucky attempted to reach out and
secure for itself a right to prescribe a rate of toll applicable not only
to persons crossing from Kentucky to Ohio, but from Ohio to Kentucky-J'a right which practically nullified the corresponding right
of Ohio to fix tolls from her own State." This would seem to be
an adequate ground for the decision. It is true to say, however,
that there are expressions in the opinion in the Covington Case
which have been considered as qualifying or everruling the conclusion expressed in the Gloucester Case" as to the power of a State
to regulate ferries upon a stream bordering two States until Con-'
gress had manifested its purpose to exert its authority over the subject
In determining the extent of a State's authority in matters
which concern the commerce of other States, it is clear that if Congress has passed laws on the same subject, these are superior to any
State statute. 10 But the difficult point is where Congress has not
acted. How far can the State then go in enacting such laws as relate to interstate commerce? The principal test which has been
acted upon by the courts and which may be regarded as well established is this: Is the subject matter of the law of such a nature as
to admit only of one uniform system throughout the country? If
so, the power of Congress to enact laws is absolutely exclusive. But
if the subject is one which does not require national uniformity,
one upon which different regulations would be suitable varying
acc6rding to the diverse interests and conditions of particular
places, the State may legislate.1 1 As an application of this principle,
State regulation on the subject of quarantine, inspection regulations
and the construction of bridges over navigable streams is held constitutional though such legislation affects interstate commerce. The
determination of the question whether the subject covered by a
State statute needs national or local control should rest with Con'z54 U. S. 234 (1894).
118 U. S. 537 (1886).
Supra, note 6.
"Cooley, Const. Lira., 6th ed., 722, 723.
'1 Cooley v. Board of Wardens. 12 How. 299 (U. S. i8s); St Clair
County v. Interstate Transfer Co.. 192 U. S. 454 (1O4); Northern P. R.
Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370 (1912); Minnesota Rate Cases, 23o U. S.
352 (1913).
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gress, as the answer turns on many considerations of practical expediency, which are pre-eminently matters for legislative investigation. Since Congress, by the express terms of tile Constitution
is given the power to regulate commerce among the States, it seems
that Congress and not the court, should have the supervising action
over such State legislation as has to do with interstate commerce. It
may then be doubted whether the judiciary should interpose in any
given case to pronounce a State regulation of commerce unconstitutional, unless itappears beyond a doubt that the subject of legislation is one requiring national uniformity, leaving to Congress its
undoubted right to annul the effect of the law by its subsequent
enactments.
There are a multitude of ferries throughout the country, and
apart from certain rules as to navigation, they have not engaged
the attention of Congress. Ferries; such as are involved in the principal case,12 are simply means of transit from shore to shore unrelated to other transportation. Ferries which are operated in connect'ion with railroads and cases where the ferriage is part of a
longer and continuous transportation are subject only to the regulation of Congress. 3 The practical advantages of having the matter
dealt with by the States where the ferriage is not a part of other
transportation, are obvious and in view of the character of the subject, we find no sound objection to its continuance. If Congress
at any time undertakes to regulate such rates, its action will, of
cohrse, control. If the State may exercise this power, it necessarily follows that it. may not, in its exercise, derogate from the
similar authority of another 'state. The State power can extend
only to the transactions within its own territory and the ferriage from
its own shore.
G. W. K.

MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITY

OF

AUTOMOBILE

OWNER

FOR NEGLIGENCE OF CHAUFFEUR FURNISHED BY THIRD PERSON-An

interesting question is presented by an analysis of the following recent decisions. In Dalrymple v. Covey Motor Car Company I the
facts were as follows: After purchasing an automobile, the owner
who had had but two lessons in operating a car, requested the dealer
to furnish him with a chauffeur to drive him to the city limits. This
man negligently ran down a pedestrian. The Supreme Court of
Oregon held that the dealer, and not the owner, was liable on the
ground that the latter had no right of control of the chauffeur, and
that furthermore, the latter was acting within the scope of his em"Port Richmond, etc., Ferry Company v. Board of Freeholders, supra,
note 2.
"N. Y. Central R. R. v. Hudson County, 227 U. S. 249 (1913).
135 Pac. Rep. 424 (Or. 1913).

NOTES

ployment at the time ihe accident occurred. In Janik v. Ford Motor
Company,2 the facts were identical, except thiat the owner had had
some experience as a driver but was unwilling to take the risk of
driving through the congested part of Detroit. The Supreme Court
of Michigan held the owner, and not the dealer, liable on the ground
that he was the special master for the time being, that he could have
taken charge himself at any time and that he had the right to control the chauffeur in everything he did. The case was distinguished
from the Oregon case, supra, n that the owner in that case was an
inexperienced driver, while in the Michigan case he was
experienced.
It is a well settled principle in this class of cases that the absolute test of liability is not the exercise of power of control, but the
right to exercise that power.3 This was admitted in both the cases
under discussion and, as may be seen from an examination of the
respective decisions, two methods were pointed out which were considered of assistance in determining whether or not the owner in
the particular case, had the right to control the chauffeur. The first
test laid down is this: was the act committed within the scope of
the driver's employm ent, or was he, at the time of the accident doing
any act in furtherance of the dealer's business? The second test
was whether or not the owner was experienced in operating automobiles.
Considering these tests in the order named, the question arises
whether the fact that the chauffeur was furthering the dealer's
business is of value in determining the latter's liability, and it is
ubmitted that it has no real bearing for the following reasons.
Where there is no doubt or dispute as to who was the master this
test undoubtedly applies, 4 but in the case under discussion the whole
question is whose servant the guilty party was at the time of the accident. Once having determined this point we need go no further
in fixing the liability becau.se if the owner is held to be the special
master, as he was in the Michigan case, supra, he is liable in spite
of the fact that the chauffeur was acting within the scope of his
general employment when the accident occurred. Moreover, it is
submitted that the chauffeur is furthering the business of the owner,
as well as that of the dealer, so this point can have no direct bearing

on the real issue.
In connection with the second test quoted, the language of the
-Supreme Court of Wisconsin in a very recent decision,3 is of inter2 r47 N. W. Rep. 5io (Mich. 1914).
SLinnehan v. Rollins, 137 Mass. 123 (1884).

'Barmore v. Vicksburg, etc., Co., 85 Miss. 426 (xmo4); Cosgrove v.
Ogden, 49 N. Y. 255 (1872); Gregory v. Ohio River R. Co., 37 NV. Va. 6o6
(1891).
'Oellette v. Supcrior Motor and Machine Works, 147 IN.W. Rep. 1014
(Wis. 19r4).

132

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

est: "There seems to be more reason to hold that there is liability
in automobile than in livery stable cases. Most people either know
how to drive a horse or how one should be driven, and-can ordinarily tell when a driver is reckless or incompetent. Many people own
automobiles who know nothing about driving them." It is submitted that the inherent error in the theory is apparent from an examination of this passage. Admitting the premises of the court, it does
not follow that those who know nothing about driving automobiles
do not know when a driver is reckless or incompetent and if the test
laid down were correct this would necessarily be tfue. It cannot be
supposed that merely because an automobile owner is ignorant of
the manipulation of the mechanical contrivances used to drive the
car that he is unable to recognize reckless driving. The two things
appear to the writer separate and distinct and this fact has apparently been completely lost sight of in the decisions enumerated. The
result of such a test would be that an owner who could not drive an
automobile could never be presumed to have the right of "control in
-a situation analogous to those enumerated although he might have
been driven for ten years and have become a perfectly competent
judge as to whether or not the particular driver, or any other, was
reckless. The correct solution of the problem seems to have been
reached in Perkins v. Stead,' an English case with similar facts.
There Mr. Justice Ridley in adopting the rule laid down by Lord
Russell in Jones v. Scullard,' an earlier English "livery - stable"
case, held "that the driver of the car, though he was the general servant of the vendor, was at the time under the control of the owner
who had the properiy in and possession of the car and that therefore he was liable to the plaintiff for the negligence of the driver."
Although the decisions are conflicting, it is submitted that this is the
practical view of the situation and that when the owner is present
the normal inference would be that he has the right to exercise
power of control over the chauffeur.

. W.L.

423 Times L R. 433 (Eng. 1907); doctrine recognized in Cunningham
v. Castle, 127 N. Y. App. Div. 583 (igo8).
1 [1898] 2 Q. B. 56S.

